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INTRODUCTION
Government action often comes with unintended consequences. The state can make
citizens’ lives better or worse, while meaning to do neither. Public policies can affect
individuals’ political and life decisions. These ideas are at play in the debate surrounding the
current state of the United States criminal justice system. The purpose of the criminal justice
system is in its name—to serve justice to those who would break the law. However, there is
continuous debate over how this should be done, including debate about how crimes should be
defined, and the proper punishment for criminal deviance. In recent decades, the United States
prison population has increased at an unprecedented rate. Currently, the U.S. imprisonment rate
is the highest in the world (Walmsley, World Prison Population List (Tenth Edition), 2014).
Some would say this is good—that society should lock criminals up and throw away the key.
Others disagree, arguing that criminal justice should be rehabilitative. The purpose of this study
is not to pass judgement on this issue, but to explore what effect this expanded criminal justice
system has on the communities it affects the most.
Research shows that the criminal justice system may have a feedback effect on the
subsequent political participation of the neighborhoods most affected by it. There are issues with
causality, however, as most factors that have been independently shown to lead to lower voter
turnout such as age and socioeconomic status, also are predictors of crime levels and criminal
justice contact. This study seeks to untangle these factors and find any link between criminal
justice contact and political participation at the congressional district level. My findings reveal
little evidence that criminal justice contact has a measurable effect on political participation.
To begin, this paper looks at the growth of the criminal justice system in recent decades.
From here, I examine the effects that criminal justice workers such as police can have on
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individuals. The ideas of policy feedback and learning are explored because these ideas are
crucial to understanding and explaining a link between the criminal justice system and political
participation. Next, I provide an overview of previous work on the relationship between criminal
justice interaction political participation. Finally, I present and analyze the research and data
developed for this study.
BACKGROUND
The criminal justice system’s reach has increased in recent decades. This increase has
been well documented, as prison populations in the United States are growing exponentially.
The number of incarcerated persons in the United States has increased from 757,409 prisoners in
state, federal, or local jail institutions in 1980, to 2,220,300 prisoners in similar institutions in
2013 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1981; Glaze & Kaeble, 2014). This trend has resulted in the
United States having the highest incarceration rate of any country in the world, with 716
prisoners per 100,000 residents (Walmsley, World Prison Population List (Tenth Edition), 2014).
The criminal justice system’s control over individuals is not limited to incarceration, but also
includes parole and probation. The number of persons under community supervision, parolees,
and probationers has similarly increased from 2,147,570 in 1985 to 4,751,400 persons on
probation or parole in 2013 (Hester, 1988; Glaze & Kaeble, 2014). This amount brings the total
amount of individuals who are under the power of correctional supervision to 6,899,000, or
2,179 persons per 100,000 of the general population (Glaze & Kaeble, 2014). These numbers do
not reflect the geographic concentration of people involved in the criminal justice system. The
rates of prison population, parolees, and probationers vary widely from state to state and
neighborhood to neighborhood. In 2013, Maine had the lowest correctional supervision rate with
980 individuals per 100,000 of the population, while Georgia had the highest rate with 8,290
individuals per 100,000 of the population (Glaze & Kaeble, 2014).
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The reach of the criminal justice system is not limited to only individuals convicted of a crime.
Many citizens are affected by the criminal justice system without even being found guilty of a
crime. In 2013, the United States had the 13th highest rate of pre-trial and remand imprisonment,
with 153 prisoners per 100,000 of the general population (Walmsley, World Pre-trial/Remand
Imprisonment List, 2014). Interestingly, two entities that ranked higher than the United States
are actually U.S. territories--Guam, which has the highest rate in the world, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands. The United States also has the highest pre-trial/remand imprisonment rate among
developed nations (Walmsley, World Pre-trial/Remand Imprisonment List, 2014). These
prisoners are individuals who are being held as suspects or are awaiting trial proceedings. They
are people who have either not been formally charged with a crime, or have not paid bail, either
by choice or circumstance, to await trial outside of prison. Typically, these individuals are held
in local jails. The number of prisoners held in local and municipal jails has increased as well. In
1985, only 256,615 prisoners were held in local jails (Gilliard, 1999). This number reflects a rate
of imprisonment of 108 prisoners per 100,000 of the general population. The number of
prisoners in jails increased subsequently, peaking in 2008 at 785,533, and has since declined to
731,208 in 2013, representing a rate of 231 per 100,000, or double the rate in 1985 (Glaze &
Kaeble, 2014). Figure 1 shows the overall trend in imprisonment rates since 1982. It includes
local, state, and federal prisoners , and those under community supervision, which includes
parole and probation. Prior to 1980s, the imprisonment rate in the United States did not rise
above 150 prisoners per 100,000 people. Since, however, the rate has increased rapidly to where
it currently sits (Bowie, 1982). Even with these high numbers of incarcerated persons, the actual
crime rate has not trended with imprisonment rates.
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Figure 1. Imprisonment and Community Supervision
Populations in the United States; 1982-2011

Community Supervision
Source: Bureau of Justice Statisitcs 1995,2012

While the criminal justice system has expanded, crime has been largely unaffected.
Figure 2 shows the combined violent and property crime rate for the United States from 19822011. There is an overall decline in both of these rates. The violent crime rate in 1980 was 597
crimes per 100,000 people, while the property crime rate was 5,353 per 100,000 people (FBI
Uniform Crime Report, 2000). Both the violent and property crime rates increased until the
early 1991, when they peaked at their highest in United States history. Since then, both rates
have declines--to 368 per 100,000 people for violent crime, and 2,731 per 100,000 people for
property crimes in 2013 (FBI Uniform Crime Report, 2014). The imprisonment rate, as shown
in Figure 1, did not see a similar fluctuation over this time period, but rather has steadily
increased since the 1970s (Bowie, 1982; Gilliard, 1999; Glaze & Kaeble, 2014). This disparity
between the imprisonment rate and the crime rate can be explained by longer sentences,
mandatory minimum sentencing, and an increase in the number of crimes that can result in jail or
prison time.
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The 1970s saw the beginning of the “War on Drugs” which drastically changed how drug
offenses were handled by the criminal justice system. The Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970, signed into law by President Richard Nixon, was the first
major legislation of the war on drugs. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 also created the
National Sentencing Commission, which standardized prison sentencing guidelines. Later laws
such as the Anti-Drug abuse act 1986 under Ronald Regan implemented strict mandatory
minimum sentences for drug related offenses. Funding was also increased for drug enforcement
efforts which combined with stricter policing practices increased the number of drug arrests,
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when the rate of drug use did not actually change much over this time period (Gottschalk, 2006).
Figure 3 shows how the rate at which individuals are arrested for drug possession has increased
independent of arrests on manufacturing or sale charges. If the drug use rate were increasing
over this time period, the supply and demand would trend together. Policing tactics are
important for the effect that the criminal justice system has on the public.
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Street-Level Bureaucracy
Citizens primarily experience the criminal justice system through individual interactions
with criminal justice workers, including police, probation and parole officers, judges, and
attorneys. These individuals exert high amounts of discretion over citizens that come into
contact with the criminal justice system. Additionally, interaction with the system is often not
voluntary on the part of the individual, unlike other forms of government service delivery such as
entitlement programs. The difference these workers within the criminal justice system can have
over individual outcomes means that the circumstances of these interactions must be examined to
understand the total effect of the criminal justice system.
The low-level workers within the criminal justice system are prime examples of what are
called “street-level bureaucrats.” These government employees directly interact with the public
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and have a high level of discretion in their jobs. Street-level bureaucrats have this high amount
of discretion, and often determine how services are delivered to citizens (Lipsky, 1980). This
discretion is necessary for service delivery, but can drastically change how a policy is
implemented versus how it was intended to be implemented. For police officers, this discretion
entails the power to impose sanctions on individuals, such as criminal charges, arrest, citations,
and fines. Judges determine sentences of criminals, and prison guards exert almost total control
over prisoners. Lastly, community supervision officers constantly monitor an individual’s
actions and make recommendations for future action. For street-level bureaucrats, it is important
to have discretion to effectively provide the best possible service to the public. These positions
require a high degree of flexibility. Discretion is necessary for police and the criminal justice
system overall because different situations can arise that are unique, and planning for all of them
is impossible given limited resources. In other cases, a police officer’s ability to assess and react
to a situation rapidly can be a life or death issue. Police officers need discretion so they can
effectively protect the public without being restricted by red tape.
This discretion, however, comes with opportunities for abuse. The ability to discriminate
affects how policing services are delivered to the general public. Within the power to arrest
people, police have the discretion to not arrest people who break the law. Overlooking possible
illegal behavior by some individuals while enforcing the law on others, creates tension and a
perception of unfairness within the system. Similar issues arise when judges hand down
differing sentences for similar crimes. However, this ability to adapt is necessary for street-level
bureaucrats because of the unpredictable and unique nature of any given situation (Lipsky,
1980). In fact, one of the reasons for the increase in the incarcerated population has been the
mandatory minimum sentences enacted in part to limit judicial discretion (Raphael & Stoll,
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2013). Discretion of government employees impacts the true effect of public policies on
individuals.
Policy Learning
Public policy itself affects how individuals decide to interact with the government and the
world around them. This means that street-level bureaucratic discretion affects individual life
outcomes. Positive and negative interactions with any individual aspect of the government affect
an individual’s view of the government and him/herself (Lipsky, 1980; Soss, 1999). Negative
interactions with government agencies have been shown to affect perceptions of the government
in general, not just the agency involved in the negative interaction. This idea of “policy
learning” is well-documented, although only a handful of studies have been conducted to identify
its role in the criminal justice system. The first major study in this field looked at how recipients
of AFDC aid viewed the government. Welfare recipients’ views of government, and their place
in the political process, have been shown to be affected by their perceptions of the welfare
agency and the workers with whom they come into contact. Joe Soss, for example, found that
welfare recipients largely saw the AFDC agency and its workers as arbitrary and unchangeable
(Soss, 1999). This view of their personal lack of efficacy, or ability to change the system, is
similarly seen in their view of government as a whole. One welfare recipient interviewed
commented: “I would expect the same sorts of treatment [as received from AFDC workers] in
Congress or wherever…” indicating this generalization of personal experience to the government
overall (Soss, 1999). This treatment by the welfare agency is further shown to be primarily
negative, and promotes passivity in the political process (Campbell, 2003). The welfare agency
is the most frequent point of contact the AFDC recipients have with any part of the government,
and their view of the larger government is derived from their interaction with the welfare system.
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In contrast, Social Security recipients viewed the government as responsive to their
needs, because of positive interaction with the Social Security system (Soss, 1999; Campbell,
2003). When these citizens interacted with their benefit system it reacted to and accommodated
their requests. Furthermore, Social Security recipients’ positive interactions with the Social
Security Administration translated into more positive views of government overall. In contrast to
the welfare recipients, clients of Social Security observe that they “always feel like [they] have
some say-so in the process” (Soss, 1999). This difference confirms earlier findings of Verba,
Schlozman, and Brady (1995) that recipients of means-tested benefits had lower participation
rates than recipients of non-means-tested benefits.
Additionally, examinations of the G.I. Bill after World War II have shown that recipients
were 30 percent more likely than those with similar education attainment and background to
participate in political activities and were involved in 50 percent more civic organizations
(Mettler, 2005). Mettler argues that this is because those receiving G.I benefits viewed the
government more positively, and therefore wished to participate in the political process of
government. For many veterans, especially minority individuals, their use of the G.I. Bill was
considered a “turning point” in their lives (Mettler, 2005). This positive view of a government
program led to these men being more active in the government, with a majority of members of
Congress being World War II veterans by 1960 (Gelpi & Feaver, 2002). These studies show that
individuals within a society learn how to interact with their government, in part, from the actions
of the government itself. For many of these programs, the actions of street-level bureaucrats
were the point of reference from which larger views of government were drawn. The criminal
justice system is not immune from this feedback.
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Part of this difference in how the programs are constructed is also derived from how the
different populations are perceived publically. Social Security recipients and veterans are
constructed as “deserving” within the political arena, so the program with which they have
contact is responsive to their needs. This treatment contrasts with that of recipients of the
welfare program, who experienced unresponsive and arbitrary service delivery. This difference
was in part due to how the different groups are constructed in the political arena. Social Security
beneficiaries and veterans are viewed as deserving of the benefits they receive, while AFDC
individuals are viewed as taking an undeserved handout (Soss, 1999; Campbell, 2003). This
relates to the criminal justice system because the target population, criminals, is one of the most
vilified populations politically. Being “tough on crime,” can be a political strategy for potential
candidates around the country (Gottschalk, 2006). Because of this perception, unintended
consequences of criminal justice expansion are often not considered.
Negative Interactions with Criminal Justice System
The growth of the criminal justice system is not only seen in the number of persons that it
has direct control over, but also the amount of contact it has with the public. Individuals come
into contact with the criminal justice system through police contact, jury duty, testifying as a
witness, and educational or outreach programs. Police, as prototypical street-level bureaucrats,
are generally the public’s most frequent points of contact with the criminal justice system. For
this reason, police interactions are important for how individuals view not only the criminal
justice system, but government overall. In addition to the other changes in criminal justice
system, police practices have evolved over the last few decades to be more intrusive in the lives
of those living in at-risk, lower income neighborhoods. The tactics and training that police use
are critical to how the criminal justice system affects the public.
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The “Broken Windows Theory” of policing has driven up police surveillance and
involvement in the neighborhoods with the highest crime. “Broken Windows” refers to an idea
that was popularized in the 1980s, which argues that minor offenses that are left unpunished lead
to more serious offenses such as violent crime, and that therefore police should crack down on
minor offenses to foster a more law-abiding community (Kelling & Wilson, 1982). This idea
was implemented by police departments across the country through the 1980s and ‘90s, but has
since come under scrutiny for the effect that it has had on the psyche of a community. In many
cases, this extra policing was only targeted at “high crime” neighborhoods (Lerman & Weaver,
2014). The stigma of low-income, or predominately minority populated communities has been
shown to drive perceptions of the threat of crime to a community (Sampson & Raudenbush,
2004). This generates a self-fulfilling prophecy concerning where crime will occur (Herbet &
Brown, 2006; Sampson & Raudenbush, 2004). Furthermore, while there is evidence that
increasing misdemeanor arrests trends with a decreased crime rate, causal links have not been
firmly established (Cerda, et al., 2009). Additionally, the drop in crime rates in cities where
broken windows policing has been implemented cannot be distinguished from the large drop in
crime rates across the country over the same time period, prompting other explanations
(Western, 2006; Barker, 2010). The debate surrounding police tactics generates mistrust of the
police and their intentions. More stops and arrests result in a higher chance of misconduct on the
part of police, which further generates mistrust of authorities. Furthermore, with more minor
crimes being investigated and pursued, more innocent individuals are caught in the net of the
criminal justice system.
In addition to the decisions of where to police, individual discretion of police officers
also affects the communities they serve. However, discretion comes with the opportunity for
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abuse of power. Police use of force has become a prominent national issue. Anecdotally, the
reaction to recent high profile incidents such as the police shooting of Michael Brown in
Ferguson, Missouri and the death of Eric Garner in Long Island, New York have sparked a
national debate on racism and the criminal justice system. In the case of Michael Brown, the
police officer used his discretion to assess the situation and determined that use of force,
shooting Brown, was necessary (Apuzzo & Eckholm, 2014). With Garner, the police officer
used a chokehold to subdue him, resulting in his death (Goodman & Baker, 2014). For these
cases, the controversy is over whether or not the police officers were justified in using deadly
force in these scenarios or whether the instances were abuses of power. And these are just some
of the most recent high profile incidents.
The public’s interactions with police or any portion of the criminal justice system shape
how citizens view the system. If individuals view public officials as just and responsive, then
they will have a more positive view of the criminal justice system. However, distrust of police
has developed in many communities. Regardless of possible differences in criminal justice
operations between geographical locations, individual views of the criminal justice system are
largely similar across the nation. National surveys indicate that there is distrust of the criminal
justice system by minority populations. For 2011 to 2013, 48 percent of nonwhite individuals
responded as having “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the criminal justice system,
which was 12 percentage points less than the proportion of white individuals responding
similarly (Jones, 2013). In many African-American communities, witnesses will not cooperate
with police because they do not think that the police have the community’s best interest at heart
(Cole, 1999). In Chicago, 60 percent of residents from African-American communities fail to
report for jury duty while only 8 percent of residents from White neighborhoods failed to report
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(Cole, 1999). According to Standish Wills, chair of the Chicago conference on black lawyers,
the problem was because “black people for a great extent, don’t have a lot of faith in the criminal
justice system” (Cole, 1999).
This distrust can partly be explained by the wide net cast by expanded police practices
and crackdowns on minor crimes. These practices not only catch criminals, but result in
numerous, often negative interactions with police by perfectly law abiding citizens. There is not
great national data on this. One study of New York City in 2012 reported that of all the stops
initiated by police in that year, only 11 percent resulted in arrest or summons (Dunn & LaPlante,
2012). It also found that over 50 percent of those stopped and subsequently not arrested were
subject to a frisk for a weapon (Dunn & LaPlante, 2012). This large number of assumedly lawabiding citizens being stopped but not issued any kind of citation is staggering. AfricanAmericans are stopped in greater numbers than Whites are. While African-Americans and
Latinos between the ages of 14 to 24 make up only about 5 percent of the population in the
United States, they accounted for over 40 percent of the total stops in 2012 (Dunn & LaPlante,
2012). Stops often include forcing citizens into humiliating positions such as lying on the
ground or being handcuffed even when no charges are brought on the individual. Derogatory
remarks are also frequently used by police, which exacerbates an already negative encounter
(Lerman & Weaver, 2014). On top of these facts, minorities were found to have contraband
confiscated at lower rates than whites, even though they were disproportionately stopped for
questioning (Dunn & LaPlante, 2012; CCR, 2009). These perceptions of how police treat
minorities affect citizens’ views of not only the police department, but also the criminal justice
system and whole government overall.
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For minorities, the use of force by police is a threat. The Center for Constitutional Rights
found that 80 percent of the stops made by the NYPD from 2005 to 2008 were Black and Latino
individuals, but they only made up about 50 percent of the total population (CCR, 2009). This is
compared to White individuals who made up 10 percent of NYPD’s stops during the same time
period, but were approximately 44 percent of New York City’s total population (CCR, 2009). In
addition, Blacks and Latinos had physical force used against them in 24 percent of stops, while
physical force was used against white individuals in only 17 percent of stops (CCR, 2009).
Arrest rates for all races were relatively equal at around 5 to 6 percent across the years (CCR,
2009). These figures not only indicate that minority individuals were targeted more than white
individuals, but that they were more likely to have force used against them. Since arrest rates
were similar for all races, this disparity indicates a racial difference in how individuals are
viewed and treated by police. Minority populations feel these disparities, and subsequently are
affected by them. However, conflicting research has shown no racial bias in police stops in other
areas of the country. For example, police in Cincinnati were found to not initiate traffic stops
based on race over a period from 2003 to 2008 (Ridgeway, 2009). Differences in policing across
geographical areas are a concern for researchers attempting to make inferences about policing
and public interaction with the criminal justice system based on just a few cities’ or single city’s
data. Often, only one city is examined, as was the case in the Center for Constitutional Rights
and Greg Ridgeway studies above. By looking at all Congressional Districts in the United
States, this study attempts to overcome this obstacle.
Group perception by the general public affects policing interactions as well. The rise in
police stops has resulted in individuals being stopped on low suspicion of actual criminal
activity. The Supreme Court sets the bar for police at the level of “reasonable suspicion” (Terry
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v. Ohio, 1968). In practice, reasonable suspicion translates to: “walking in a high crime area,”
“fitting the description,” and “furtive movements,” among other things. What this means is that
almost anyone of a minority race or ethnicity in or near “high crime” areas can be stopped and
questioned by the police (Lerman & Weaver, 2014). These constructions of the populations that
live in low income neighborhoods result in more police interaction and harassment of law
abiding citizens (Schneider & Ingram, 1993). Interactions based on reasons that are seen as
unfair result in a citizenry that feels persecuted for its appearance or place of residence rather
than a truly reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing. In addition, the image constructed of residents
in low income neighborhoods makes it easy for police and politicians to justify such tactics to the
general population.
Disenfranchisement
The debate surrounding felon disenfranchisement is not the focus of this study, but it is
related because of its relationship to the criminal justice system’s effect on citizens’ ability to
participate in government. Felon disenfranchisement also has been shown to effect non-felons’
political participation rates (Burch, 2013). In all but two American states, citizens that commit
felonies lose the right to vote, and their ability to regain it varies by state. In addition, felons are
also excluded in many states from other civil and political actions such as serving on a jury, and
holding political office. The differences in states’ policies on the issue are evidence of the lack
of consensus on what rights the convicted should retain. Proponents argue that having
committed an especially heinous crime, the felony offender has broken the social contract, and
therefore, gives up their right to participate in the decision making process of the state (Ewald,
2002). Opponents argue that the disproportionate representation of minorities in the felon
population means that their disenfranchisement is actually a form of institutional racism, even if
unintentional. Observers note that the stigma associated with criminality has effectively taken
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away any civil right progress made for African-American men in the United States (Western,
2006). Furthermore, disenfranchisement has been shown to demotivate political participation in
neighborhoods with high rates of imprisonment and community supervision (Burch, 2013). This
has also been shown possibly to affect election outcomes (Miles, 2004). However, opposing
arguments have been made that these individuals do not vote in large numbers regardless, so the
fact that these issues may depress voter turnout marginally have little effect on elections (Uggen
& Manza, 2002). One issue with studies examining these effects is that many of the
socioeconomic and demographic factors at play trend with both political participation and
criminal activity, so isolating a single variable as a causal force is difficult.
Specific Studies on the Criminal Justice System and Political Participation
In addition to the previously mentioned issues related to the policing of low income
neighborhoods, these circumstances disproportionally affect minority populations due to their
likelihood of having lower income. Researchers have shown, however, that holding factors such
as socio-economic factors and age constant, African-Americans are targeted more than their
white counterparts of similar circumstance (Lerman & Weaver, 2014). These results indicate that
minority interactions with police are not simply results of their circumstance of life, but rather a
result of underlying racial perceptions. When minority populations feel victimized in this way, it
decreases their faith in the system and the government overall.
Recently, studies have built on the idea that the government indirectly affects political
participation by examining the role of the criminal justice system in shaping views of
government as a whole. Weaver and Lerman examine this topic in depth by conducting
qualitative surveys of individuals in three cities, and analyzing national quantitative date. They
find that residents of areas with high criminal justice contact are more likely to be voluntarily
removed from the political process, and view the government as something over which they can
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have no effect (Lerman & Weaver, 2014). In these areas, the criminal justice system is so
pervasive that individuals who have not had direct contact with it have similar negative
perceptions of government (Lerman & Weaver, 2014). These findings support the quantitative
data that Weaver and Lerman also examine in order to find more general trends beyond the three
cities they specifically study. They find that the level of criminal justice contact had an effect
on likelihood of voting for individuals in two national surveys--the Fragile Families and Child
Wellbeing survey and the National Longitudinal study of Adolescent Health (Lerman & Weaver,
2014). The seriousness of past contact with police, from a routine stop to serving serious time,
depressed the likelihood that an individual would vote as the level of contact became more
serious, even after controlling for other variables. Another study conducted by Traci Burch looks
at how felon disenfranchisement, specifically, affects the participation of the non-disenfranchised
population, finding a negative relationship (Burch, 2013). Marc Mauer also looked at felons and
the effect on the non-felon community, and concluded similarly (Mauer, 2006). These studies
suggest that there is likely a link between how the criminal justice system treats the populations
that it targets and how others in the community are affected.
Factors Driving Political Participation
Many factors drive political participation, so attempting to isolate the criminal justice
system as having an effect can be difficult. This paper uses voter turnout as the primary method
of assessing political participation because past studies have shown the criminal justice system
having mixed effects on turnout. Most agree that criminal justice contact negatively affects
political efficacy and community stability, and may in turn reduce political participation (Burch,
2013; Lerman & Weaver, 2014). One issue with trying to disentangle the relationship between
voter turnout and criminal justice contact is that many variables seem to correlate with and
predict both. For example, socioeconomic status has been shown to influence voter turnout, and

19
lower-income neighborhoods also have higher crime rates (Blais & Dobrzynska, 1998; Lawless
& Fox, 2001; Lerman & Weaver, 2014). Education correlates with voter turnout, and prisoners
typically have less education than non-prisoners (Harlow, 2003; Timpone, 1998) Young people
are more likely to have contact with police, but are also less likely to vote (Timpone, 1998;
Lerman & Weaver, 2014). However, previous research has indicated that there is likely a link
between criminal justice contact and lower political participation (Mauer, 2006; Burch, 2013;
Lerman & Weaver, 2014). This study seeks to look past select cities as most previous research
has concentrated on and dig into whether there is a national trend at the congressional district
level. Furthermore, some studies looking into criminal justice interaction and political
participation have found some evidence that it can promote participation. Interestingly, Burch
found that at low amounts of criminal justice interaction, political participation actually increases
with criminal justice contact, but after a point that level decreases (Burch, 2013). Similarly,
another study found that when a person has a close friend or family member affected by the
criminal justice system, this increases political participation (Walker, 2014). This conflict with
other research seems to be able to be reconciled by arguing that when the criminal justice
system’s impact is close and salient, then a person becomes more mobilized, but as the criminal
justice system becomes a major factor in the life of the community the opposite becomes true.
This study goes above the neighborhood level typically studied for this topic and seeks to answer
if these trends are can be seen on a broader and nation-wide scale.
DATA
This study examines whether or not the criminal justice system affects political
participation. The level of analysis is the Congressional District. Election and demographic data
is available for all congressional districts, allowing this study to examine the possible presence of
a nationwide trend. Here I study the 2010 midterm election. This is because adequate data for

20
prison populations is only available through the decennial census, so the most recent, the 2010
Census, was chosen. The data sources used were the Federal Election Commission’s official
publication of ballots cast in the 2010 elections, the 2010 Census, the American Community
Survey, and the Sentencing Project’s data on state-level disenfranchised individuals (FEC 2011,
U.S. Census 2010; American Community Survey 2010; Sentencing Project 2012). Other figures
were calculated based on numbers found in these sources. My hypothesis is that the local
correctional population, after controlling for other associated variables, will have a statistically
significant negative relationship with voter turnout, for at least the 90% confidence level. The
null hypothesis is that the local correctional population has no effect on voter turnout. A linear
regression analysis of the variables, including control and dummy variables, was used to test my
hypothesis.
Voter Turnout
For this analysis voter turnout data was calculated from the ballot counts published by the
House of Representatives. This ballot count was combined with census data on the voting age
population in order to calculate the voter turnout for each congressional district. Only ballots
cast in each district’s House of Representatives race were used. There were three districts where
the only candidate ran unopposed.1 These districts were excluded from this analysis as there was
no ballot count recorded. The calculated turnout rate was then used as the dependent variable.
Census Data
Since the 2010 census was used, there is a wealth of demographic information available
at the congressional district level. The primary independent variable is the number of persons in
a local jail or correctional facility in the district. The census breaks the total population
institutionalized in correctional facilities into federal, state, and local jurisdictions, then further,
1

The districts were: Florida’s 21st, Louisiana’s 7th, and Oklahoma’s 4th congressional districts.
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by type of institution. For local correctional facilities, jails and residential facilities are identified
as possible options. The sum of these two populations was used to find the total number of
persons under correctional supervision at the local level. This number was then converted to a
percentage of the total population above age 18. Only those above age 18 were used because
juvenile institutions are reported separately. The number of persons in juvenile institutions, both
correctional and non-correctional in nature, as a percentage of the population under the age of 18
was also calculated for analysis. For several congressional districts, the local jail population was
0.2 Incarcerated populations are typically presented as a rate per 100,000 of total population, but
here a percentage is used for uniformity with other variables. The final result is not altered due
to this difference.
One issue that needed to be addressed in the analysis is that the determinants of voter
turnout also drive crime and imprisonment rates. In order to control for this, several other
variables were included in the analysis. The variables identified as possible control variables
were education, age, income, race and ethnicity, and eligibility to vote. Education was
calculated as a percent of persons 25 and older holding a high school diploma or equivalent.
Education data was available through the census. Age was controlled for based on the youth
population of the district. This was calculated as the percentage of the voting age population in
the range of 18-25 years old. These data come from the census. Two different income variables
were incorporated into the analysis. Both the median household income, as determined by
household income for the preceding year, and the percent of the population below the poverty
line were used as controls for income level of individuals in each congressional district. The
figures for the percentage below the poverty line came from census data, while the median
household income was found in the American Community Survey’s 5-year estimates. The
2

This potential issue is discussed in depth in the Conclusion Section.
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percentage below the poverty line should have been especially useful in this analysis, as low
income is known to correlate to high crime rates and low voter turnout (Lawless & Fox, 2001;
Lerman & Weaver, 2014). For race and ethnicity, different percentages of groups were
considered as control variables, but the ratio of white individuals to the number of AfricanAmericans and Hispanics and Latinos together proved most robust. These data for race and
ethnicity was taken from the census.
A population’s eligibility to vote was determined by two variables that included a number
of different populations. First, non-citizens cannot vote and are included in the ineligible
population. Second, the vast majority of individuals in federal and state prisons cannot vote due
to the fact that they are either ineligible by law or they are located in a district or state other than
their own. For these reasons, they are included in this number as well. These two populations
constitute a congressional district level population that is ineligible to vote which was then
analyzed as a percentage of the total population. All of this data is provided by the census. The
second variable to account for ineligible populations was the Sentencing Project’s available data
on disenfranchised individuals. These state-level data include already mentioned populations of
federal and state prisons, so they were subtracted out due to more specific congressional district
level data on those populations. The other individuals included in the disenfranchised population
at the state level are individuals on probation, parole, and ex-convicts who are disenfranchised.
These figures depend on the state’s policies. Unfortunately, these data are not available on a
level more localized than to the state, but the state’s overall nature can be used as a proxy
indicator.
Results
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The variables were calculated for each congressional district in 2010, then correlation and
regression analysis was performed on voter turnout and the various possible predictors. As
indicated previously, the three districts with an uncontested race were excluded. Additionally,
there were 17 districts without any local correctional population. These districts were excluded
in the following analysis because the reasons for absolutely no correctional population are not
related to the demographic characteristics of the districts. The regression model with these cases
included is reported in Appendix A for comparison, but they have been excluded here.3 This
brings the total N of the sample to 415. For this analysis, the lowest possible p-value that
statistical significance will be reported at will be the 90% confidence interval.
Table 1. Correlation Results for Voter Turnout and
Possible Predictors
Pearson
Correlation

N

House Rep Turnout
Percent Local
Corrections

1

415

-.227**

415

White-Minority Ratio

.460**

415

State's Percent
Disenfranchised

-.160**

415

Percent Holding HS
Diploma or Equivalent

.724**

415

Percent Ineligible Voters

-.606**

415

Percent 18-25yrs old
Median Household
Income

-.379**

415

.273**

415

Percent in Poverty

-.510**

415

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

3

The cause of a correctional population of 0 can be attributed to how congressional districts are drawn and local
administrative decisions. If the area has a high density population such as a large city, then some districts may be
smaller than the service area of local jails. Some localities are also opting to contract out jail service to nearby
counties and municipalities. Due to lack of knowledge as to why any given district has a local correctional
population of 0, districts with that characteristic are excluded.
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Table 1 reports the results of the correlation analysis. Pearson’s r was used to calculate
correlation. All of the possible predictors correlated with voter turnout (House Rep Turnout).
All of the predictors had statistically significant correlations with voter turnout at the 99 percent
confidence level. The percentage of individuals below the poverty line (Percent in Poverty), the
percentage of youth (Percent 18-25yrs Old), the percent of individuals ineligible to voter
(Percent Ineligible Voters), the percent of the adult population in local correctional facilities
(Local Correctional Population), and the state’s percentage of disenfranchised individuals
(State's Percent Disenfranchised) all negatively correlated with voter turnout. The ratio of white
residents to minority residents (White-Minority Ratio), the percentage of individuals with at least
a high school diploma or equivalent (Percent Holding HS Diploma or Equivalent), and the
median household income (Median Household Income) all correlated positively with voter
turnout. The strongest negative correlation was seen in the percentage ineligible to vote. The
strongest positive correlation was seen in the percentage with at least a high school diploma.
Specifically, the percentage of individuals in a local correctional facility is weakly, negatively
correlated with voter turnout.
Tables 2 and 3 report the results of multiple regression analysis of the possible
independent variables on voter turnout. The regression model with all of the predictors included
produced an R2 value of 0.614 and was statistically significant at the 99.9 percent confidence
interval as determined by an F-ratio test. Table 3 reports the individual results of each predictor.
Three variables, the White-Minority ratio, the percentage holding a high school degree or higher,
and the percentage of ineligible voters, were significant at greater than the 99.9 percent
confidence interval. A state’s overall percentage of disenfranchised individuals in the
community was statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence interval. The percentage of
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Table 2. Multiple Regression on Voter Turnout Model
Model
1

R
.784

R Square
0.614

Adjusted Std. Error of
R Square the Estimate
F
0.606
5.05% 80.702***

*** Significant at the 99.9% Confidence level (p ≤ 0.001)

Table 3. Coefficient Results of Multiple Regression on Voter Turnout

Variable
(Constant)

Unstandardized
Standardized
Coefficients
Coefficients
B
Std. Error Beta
-12.614

8.144

White-Minority Ratio***

0.228

0.048

Percent Local Corrections

0.142

t

p-value

-1.549

0.122

0.181

4.726

3.16E-06

1.145

0.004

0.124

0.902

-0.237

0.101

-0.078

-2.339

0.020

0.601

0.081

0.492

7.447

5.76E-13

0.104

0.119

0.071

0.877

0.381

Percent 18-25yrs old*4

-0.248

0.134

-0.072

-1.845

0.066

Percent Ineligible Voters***

-0.336

0.075

-0.244

-4.463

1.05E-05

5.00E-05

4.17E-05

0.087

1.199

0.231

State's Percent
Disenfranchised**5
Percent Holding HS Diploma
or Equivalent***
Percent in Poverty

Median Household Income

Dependent Variable: House Rep Turnout
*** Significant at the 99.9% confidence level (p ≤ 0.001)
** Significant at the 95% confidence level (p ≤ 0.05)
* Significant at the 90% confidence level (p ≤ 0.1)

4

The significances of Percent 18-25yrs old and the State’s Percent Disenfranchised are the major differences
between including the cases with no local correctional population or not. When those with no local correctional
population are included the p-value of Percent 18-25yrs old increases to 0.172 and the p-value of State’s Percent
Disenfranchised increases to0.021, and the variables become statistically insignificant at the 90% confidence level.
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18-25yr olds relative to the total adult population was a significant predictor at the 90 percent
confidence interval. A district’s median household income, the percentage of individuals in
poverty, and the percent of the population in local correctional facilities all were not significant
at the 90 percent confidence interval. The percentage of individuals in local correctional
facilities is not even above a 50 percent confidence interval. In addition, the coefficient of the
percent of the population in local correctional facilities is positive, while the correlation result
was negative. However, it was not a statistically significant value, so that provides little
explanatory information.
ANALYSIS
The hypothesis that the local correctional population would have an effect on voter
turnout at the district level was not supported. In the regression model, the percentage of the
local population in local corrections facilities had a p-value of 0.901, and therefore was not
statistically significant. Regressing the local correctional percentage on voter turnout by itself
resulted in a statistically significant regression. The difference once other variables are
introduced indicates that other factors are influencing voter turnout more than simply the local
correctional population. Furthermore, since many of these variables correlate with the local
correctional population, in addition to voter turnout, the issue of collinearity could be influencing
the model. This could also mean that the local correctional population and the other variables
reflect the same underlying factors. Unfortunately, total criminal justice contact statistics, which
would be ideal for this study, are not available at the congressional district level. Local
correctional population was used as a proxy to this desired measure, but it was not found to be
statistically significant. Either criminal justice contact has no effect on voter turnout, or the
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variable used was not sufficient in acting as a representative. Given previous work on the
criminal justice system and political participation, the latter option is likely more correct.
A related variable, the state’s overall disenfranchised population, was statistically
significant in predicting voter turnout. With a p-value of 0.02, the state’s disenfranchisement
rate was predictive of voter turnout at above the 95 percent confidence interval. The fact that
this measure was significant while local jail population was not is interesting. This rate as
reported only included those individuals in the community who were disenfranchised. Being the
population most affected by the criminal justice system within the community means that this
variable is a good measure of what effect the criminal justice system has on the general public.
However, due to this data being at the state level, not much can be inferred about the localized
outcomes due to the criminal justice system. This result could be because having more
individuals who have gone through the criminal justice system reduces turnout either by their
lack of legal voting rights or because it has an effect on the general public. This finding could
also be unrelated and simply signal that there are inherent differences between states in the
factors that drive voter turnout. If this kind of data were available at the district level, it could be
even more informative.
Another variable related to the criminal justice system is the percent of ineligible voters.
This factor was also a statistically significant predictor of voter turnout within the model at the
99.9 percent confidence level. This is as expected due to the fact that non-citizens cannot vote
but are counted within the voting age population. Additionally, the prison populations included
are not able to vote because they are either not actually located in their home district or their
voting rights are restricted by law. If the voting eligible population was to be used instead of the
voting age population, then these two populations would be included in the excess voting age
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population. The voting eligible population was unable to be calculated with this data due to the
fact that aggregate data on individuals’ ages within these populations is not available at the
congressional district level. These results are expected and not much information can be inferred
from them at the district level. They indicate that overall the presence of these populations is
something that should be accounted for when determining representation levels such as in the
redistricting process, which they are not currently. The presence of populations that cannot vote
that the individuals in districts with a high percentage of these populations have a more powerful
vote because there are less legal voters in the district than the number of allocated representatives
would suggest.
Three variables with no direct relationship to the criminal justice system were also found
to be statistically significant. The variable with the largest magnitude coefficient was the
educational attainment variable. The percentage of the population having at least a high school
diploma or equivalent was a statistically significant factor in the regression. With a coefficient
of 0.601, for a 1 percentage point increase in the population having at least a high school
diploma, voter turnout is expected to increase by 0.601 percentage points, on average. This
would support the idea that education gives a person the skills and resources that allow them to
be more politically active. The calculated ratio of white individuals to minority individuals was
also found to be statistically significant at the 99.9 percent confidence level. This factor serves
as a catch all for race related disparities within the population. Since it is a ratio, the actual
percent of a population being white predicts voter turnout on a logarithmic scale. Lastly, the
percent of the population being 18-25 years of age was also a statistically significant predictor at
greater than the 90 percent confidence level. This follows past research that young people tend
to vote less than older individuals, so districts with more young people should see a lower overall
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turnout. This also possibly accounts for part of the variability predicted by the local jail
population as young people are more likely to come into contact with the criminal justice system.
Finally, income as measured by poverty level and median household income was not a
statistically significant predictor of voter turnout.
Once all of these factors were accounted for the local correctional population was not
statistically significant in predicting voter turnout. For this case, the conclusion is to fail to reject
the null hypothesis. It is likely that the factors that drive criminal justice contact are accounted
for in the other factors such as education and race. More specific data, such as crime or arrest
rates, on criminal justice activity on a congressional district level would have possibly produced
a different result because local correctional population does not encompass all of the ways in
which the criminal justice system interacts with individuals in the community.
CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, the hypothesis that the local jail population would be seen to affect
political participation was not supported. However, other factors that have previously been
shown to affect voter turnout were reaffirmed here. One issue with performing this analysis is
how the census calculates the population of those imprisoned. For prisoners, the jail or prison
they are held in is counted as their residence for purposes of the census. This is an issue when
studies are performed on incarcerated populations because a link between the imprisoned
population and the community at large is difficult to determine. This study attempted to account
for this issue by only using the local correctional population because those individuals should be
local to the community in which their facility is located. However, if criminal justice contact
does have an effect on a community’s political participation, this was not shown to be a
sufficient corollary to use. If prisoners were counted in the census by last place of residence or
the locality where they were taken into custody, then that measure would provide a more
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accurate representation of criminal justice contact overall. This would also allow state and
federal prison populations to be used because the differences in local communities would be able
to be determined. In doing so, the full effect of the criminal justice system overall could be
examined. In addition, the issue of some local correctional populations being 0 would be solved
because even if a local government contracts out its jail management to other entities, or the
geographic area examined is smaller than the service area for the nearest correctional facility, the
community affected by the criminal justice intervention would still be available.
Further research could examine this possible connection more. There may be better ways
to get at local criminal justice contact than simply looking at the local jail population. A more
robust analysis could gather quantitative and qualitative data from a wide range of cities,
including different sizes and backgrounds, in order to better unravel what effect the criminal
justice system is having on a local population. The census tracking prisoners by where they are
from, and not where they end up would also help in analyses on this subject. Regardless of
methods of analysis, the criminal justice system has grown larger and more intrusive in citizens’
lives, and analyzing what affects this new force has on citizens’ decisions and life outcomes is
important for a democratic society.
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Appendix A: Results including Local Correctional Populations of 0
Correlation Results for Voter Turnout and Possible Predictors
Variable
Pearson Correlation
N
House Rep Turnout
Percent Local Corrections
White-Minority Ratio
State's Percent Disenfranchised
Percent Holding HS Diploma or
Equivalent
Percent Ineligible Voters
Percent 18-25yrs old
Median Household Income
Percent in Poverty

1

432

-.169**

432

.467**

432

-.137**

432

.720**

432

-.639**

432

-.362**

432

.257**

432

-.499**

432

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Variable
(Constant)
White-Minority Ratio
Percent Local
Corrections
State's Percent
Disenfranchised
Percent Holding HS
Diploma or Equivalent
Percent in Poverty
Percent 18-25yrs old
Percent Ineligible
Voters
Median Household
Income

Regression Model
Unstandardized
Standardized
Coefficients
Coefficients
Std.
B
Error
Beta
-8.804
8.041

t
-1.095

p-value
.274

.221***

.048

.170

4.572

6.36E-06

.627

1.132

.019

.554

.580

-.233

.100

-.075

-2.325

.021

.557***

.079

.449

7.062

6.78E-12

.060

.117

.040

.517

.605

-.184

.134

-.052

-1.369

.172

-.410***

.071

-.302

-5.757

1.65E-08

4.974E-05

.000

.084

1.228

.220

Dependent Variable: House Rep Turnout
*** Significant at the 99.9% confidence level (p ≤ 0.001)
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